James Madison on Representation and Democracy

Written for the subject Introduction to Political Ideas.

James Madison’s view of democracy is a representative one, centred around the model of a republic wherein elected representatives create policy on behalf of their constituents. This essay examines democracy with respect to Madison’s republic, which he presents in Federalist No. 10 (1788). Firstly, this essay will provide a general discussion of direct and representative democracy, and secondly will analyse Madison’s own republican model. This analysis will reveal two primary solutions the republic provides for democracy. Namely, that the republican representation facilitates improved legislative decision-making, and also prevents the dominance of an oppressive political majority. However, Madison’s model also creates provides two obstacles for democracy: firstly with respect to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of the general will and secondly in context of Joseph Schumpeter’s democratic elitist critique. Ultimately, this essay will find Madison’s republic to be a satisfactory form of democracy.

To understand the need for Madison’s republic, a foundational understanding of democracy should first be established. Democracy – derived from the Greek kratos (power, rule) and demos (the people) – means to ‘rule by the people’[1]. The fundamental strength of democracy is its ability to pursue benefit for all, i.e. carry out the will of the people. This is achieved through its capacity for participation, rational delegation, and equality. We can evaluate a democracy based on how well it meets these conditions. There are two predominant forms democracy: direct democracy and representative democracy. Direct democracy is “any form of democracy in which the people vote on policies” [2]. This necessitates the direct presence of all citizens in the legislative process. In a representative democracy, citizens of an electorate vote for a political representative who creates legislation on their behalf.  The electorate is geographically determined, ensuring an equal distribution of voting power. It is thereby through the consent of its citizens, as opposed to through their direct input, that the authority of a representative democracy is legitimised. The latter is the form of democracy for which Madison advocates.

In the first half of Federalist No. 10, Madison expounds the flaws of direct democracy which, until the establishment of The Constitution, was the dominant democratic model adopted by the US. The primary concern identified is the “instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils” by factions, which were prevalent in pre-Madisonian government.[3] Madison defines a faction as “a number of citizens… who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest”.[4] In a direct democracy, citizens are necessarily both judges of, and interested parties in, political issues because they directly influence legislation in which they may have a vested interest.[5] This conflict of interest motivates citizens to disregard the common good in favour of their own personal interests. Therefore, the “most powerful faction must be expected to prevail”[6]. Furthermore, there exists no mechanism to prevent the faction from “sacrific[ing] the weaker party” in prioritising their own personal interests[7]. Therefore, faction presents an obstacle to a democratic pursuit of the public good.

The fundamental purpose of Madison’s republic is therefore “to secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government”.[8] The republic achieves this balance in two essential ways. Firstly, in the structure of government. As aforementioned, the republic is a system of popular government in which elected representatives act on behalf of a particular group of citizens in federal government. Secondly, Madison’s republic differs in the size of the electorate over which it presides. The scope of a direct democracy is necessarily much smaller than a representative one, since the direct presence of each citizen is required for legislative assembly – an onerous practical challenge. By comparison, republican representation allows a smaller number of representatives to act for a larger number of diverse constituents. As such, the republic can operate at a national, as opposed to state, level.

The first solution to democracy provided by Madison’s republic is an improvement in legislative decision-making, such that policy better acts in the public interest. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the larger purview of Madison’s republic refines the political judgement of its representatives. Each representative is obliged to consider and understand a diverse range of political perspectives since they represent a large range of people and interests. Given Madison’s reference to representatives’ “wisdom” [9], we can infer that they must therefore possess the ability to make more informed political judgements than regular citizens. In fact, Madison suggests that representatives therefore understand the interests of the citizenry better than the citizens themselves. Consequently, the public view as distilled by Congress will be “more consonant to the public good”[10]. This is significant because a successful realisation of the public will is one of the republic’s main purposes. Secondly, the larger scope of each electorate increases the probability of the election of a “fit character”[11].  By such a character, Madison refers to representatives as “most diffusive and established”[12], and hence more reliable. Therefore, law and policy created by representatives will be more consonant with the common good than if rendered by the people themselves. So, the benefit of republican representatives is bi-fold: representatives will both expand and refine legislative decision-making.

The second solution Madison’s republic provides is the prevention of oppressive factional rule, which Madison identifies as one of the key pitfalls of direct democracy. The republic achieves this in two ways. Firstly, the outright size and diversity of the republic’s constituency renders the nationwide dominance of a faction unlikely. If a faction must impress itself on a larger majority, it becomes practically difficult to coordinate a common motive, particularly an oppressive one. Knott concurs that “large, diffuse interests have a much more difficult time organising for political action”[13]. Importantly, Madison qualifies that even if a faction succeeds in “kindl[ing] a flame” in one electorate, it will be “less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union”[14]. In addition, the introduction of the elected representative provides an additional degree of separation between local factionalism and legislative decision-making. In debate at the Philadelphia Convention, Madison described representatives not just as “mere advocates of state interests & views”, but also as “impartial umpires and guardians of justice and the general Good”[15]. A combination of this impartial quality, a keen understanding of the ‘general Good’, and the representative’s “patriotism and love of justice”[16] suggests that representatives are less likely to “sacrifice [the public good]”[17] to factional pressures. This is achieved through a pluralistic mediation of localised interests and the interests of the republic as a whole. Therefore, legislative decision-making is shielded from localised factional struggles. This prevents the dominance of a majority faction that may undermine a pursuit of the public good. Secondly, the representative’s role as a proxy for citizens allows them to internalise competing factional interests, restoring political stability. Madison explains the tendency of factions to “vex and oppress” each other, rather than cooperating in pursuit of the common good.[18] This propensity leaves individual voters to navigate a fragmented political landscape which is “too unstable” and characterised by “instability, injustice, and confusion”[19]. Edwards provides the mechanism for this, in that “when faced with more than two options, democratic decision-making is subject to the destabilizing effects of cycling and the opportunistic manipulation of agenda-setters.”[20] As such, representatives have a function of reconciling “the dissonance between competing interests”.[21] Therefore, republican representation and debate can arbitrate the conflicts between the various intense factions of each constituency. Hence, Madison’s republic ameliorates the political confusion and instability prominent in direct democracy, thereby removing this as an obstacle to achieving the common will.

The first problem associated with Madison’s democracy is the inability of representatives to fully realise the interests of their constituents, thereby jeopardising each citizen’s political liberty. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s argument in opposition of representative democracy articulates this. In Rousseau’s The Social Contract (2010), the general will “must come from all and apply to all”[22] and is the primary source of law. This can only be realised when “there [is] no partial society within the state, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts” [23]. Urbinati articulates this more precisely: for Rousseau, it is necessary that “the political event (decision) and the political actor (the people) coincide”[24]. Therefore, political liberty cannot be isolated from the will. As a representative democracy, Madison’s republic is inherently non-inclusive due to the loss of direct voting ability. Therefore, it is the partial will of a few representatives, as opposed to the individual will of all citizens, that informs law and policy. Consequently, citizens may become bound by terms they themselves did not agree on. For Rousseau, this would constitute an inexorable violation of political liberty, from which Madison’s republic would be an unsatisfactory form of democracy. However, I find this objection largely unconvincing. Though the conceptual mechanism of Rousseau’s argument is coherent, his argument hinges on a narrow consideration of political liberty. Ultimately, I find that Madison’s republic prevails. Crucially, republican representation does not seek to directly include each citizen’s personal opinions in law. Instead, it is through representatives’ discernment of their collective interests that democracy is achieved. Even if Madison’s republic does not satisfy Rousseau’s narrow conditions for democracy, the broader advantages of republican representation aforementioned ultimately outweigh the alleged problem it creates for democracy.

A second problem of Madison’s republic arises from Joseph Schumpeter’s democratic elitist critique, which he explains in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1976). This scrutinises the reliance of representative democracy on not only the ‘common good’, but also on its assumption that citizens can undertake meaningful political deliberation. An application of these criticisms to Federalist No. 10 will reveal that the republic cannot be an effectual democracy. Schumpeter first refutes the existence of a common will and therefore public good. This is primarily due to the “fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things”[25]. As a consequent, irreconcilable differences in principle and “ultimate value” will arise. Any compromise of these values would “only maim and degrade” [26] each individual’s normative agency. Therefore, a universally agreed common good is largely inconceivable. Even if a distinct common good exists, this does not guarantee that individual issues have an equally distinct answer. Therefore, Schumpeter’s dismantlement of the public good cripples the conceptual foundations of Madison’s republic. If the common good does not exist, republican representation becomes redundant in achieving democracy. The desired effect is reversed: the act of the representative in synthesising, and therefore compromising, the public view actually forces citizens to surrender their political agency, as opposed to protect it. Madison also makes an apparently fatal error in assuming the capability of citizens as rational decision-makers. Even if a public will still emerges, it crucially lacks “rational sanction”[27] or approval. Schumpeter attributes this to “vague impulses, “mistaken impressions”, and “pressure groups and propaganda” which impede the citizen’s rational capacity[28]. Admittedly, Madison has constructed the republican representative to minimise the impact of factions’ “vicious arts”[29] in addressing this. However, Madison still relies on the underlying judgements of citizens in electing their representatives. Therefore, the motivated cognition of a republic’s citizens still plays a crucial role in its function. From Schumpeter’s elitist perspective, “attributing to the will of the individual an independence and a rational quality” is “altogether unrealistic”[30]. He goes further to say that “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field… he becomes a primitive again”[31]. Therefore, the inclusion of citizens in Madison’s republic diminishes the quality of rational deliberation, a key pillar of democracy. Therefore, Madison’s representative structure is an ineffectual form of democracy. However, this is more so to the extent that a definite common good is implausible, since Madison somewhat responds to Schumpeter’s second point.

Ultimately, James Madison’s Federalist No. 10 provides a largely compelling case for republican representation as a valuable form of democracy. By altering the structure and scope of the republic, Madison for the most part succeeds in justifying why it will not only improve legislative decision-making but also prevent oppressive faction rule. A theoretical refutation of this comes from Rousseau’s work, which it is ultimately unconvincing due to its narrow scope in a broader consideration of democratic ideals. Schumpeter offers a more persuasive critique of representative democracy, by attacking the foundational justifications for representative democracy.  However, this only succeeds on its first count. Therefore, Madison’s republican representation most importantly provides meaningful solutions for democracy.

Bibliography

Chin, C. & Heywood, A. (2023). The Problem of Democracy: Representation and the Public Good. In Political Theory, 5th ed. (pp. 184-210). Bloomsbury.

Edwards, P. S. (2000). Madisonian Democracy and Issue Advocacy: An Argument for Deregulating Private Funding of Political Parties. In Catholic University Law Review, vol. 50, no. 1 (pp. 49-63).

Knott, J. H. (2011). Federalist No. 10: Are Factions the Problem in Creating Democratic Accountability in the Public Interest?. In Public Administration Review, vol. 71 (pp. 29-36). Wiley for American Society for Public Administration.

Madison, J. (1787). Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. In Madison Debates June 26. The Avalon Project, Yale Law School.

Madison, J. (1788). No. 10. In The Federalist Papers (pp. 52-57).

Matsusaka, J. G. (2020). Direct Democracy Defined. In Let the People Rule (pp. 61-65). Princeton University Press.

Rousseau, J. (2010). Book II Chapter IV The limits of the sovereign power. In The Social Contract. (pp. 14-16). Jonathan Bennett. First published 1762.

Schumpeter, J. (1976). The Classical Doctrine of Democracy. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 5th ed. (pp. 250-269). George Allen & Unwin. First published 1943.

Urbinati, N. (2011). Representative democracy and its critics. In The Future of Representative Democracy. (pp. 23-49). Cambridge University Press.

[1] Chin & Heywood, 2023, p. 185

[2] Matsusaka, 2020, p. 62

[3] Madison, 1788, p. 52

[4] Madison, 1788, p. 53

[5] Ibid., p. 54

[6] Ibid.

[7] Madison, 1788, p. 57

[8] Ibid., p. 55

[9] Ibid., p. 56

[10] Madison, 1788, p. 56

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Knott, 2011, p. 32

[14] Madison, 1788, p. 57

[15] Madison, 1787 Debates June 26

[16] Madison, 1788, p. 56

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 54

[19] Ibid., p. 52

[20] Edwards, 2000, p. 56

[21] Ibid., p. 57

[22] Rousseau, Book II, Chapter IV, p. 15

[23] Ibid.

[24] Urbinati, 2011, p. 10

[25] Schumpeter, 1976, p. 251

[26] Ibid.

[27] Schumpeter, 1976, p. 253

[28] Schumpeter, 1976, pp. 253-254

[29] Madison, 1788, p. 56

[30] Schumpeter, 1976, p. 253

[31] Schumpeter, 1976, p. 262